Suppose L is the accepted (or best) logic for science and T is a purely logical theorem of L. Aren't those that ascribe to L required to accept T upon pain of intellectual dishonesty?
No, I'm just trying to establish a general principle.
However, the ontological argument isn't based on purely logical principles. That something actual(izing) is greater (either in the metaphysical or epistemological senses) than something which is merely possible, while plausible, isn't a purely logical principle; Lewis argues that this premise isn't sound because the actual world isn't ontologically unique. That means that other possible worlds are spatiotemporal expanses of mass and energy, just like the actual world. Now, I disagree with Lewis here, because his "possible worlds" seem to me to be nothing more than a multiverse, all of which is contained within the actual world.
Establishing the premise that the omnipotent or omniscient is metaphysically possible is trickier, I admit. Maybe conceptual coherence doesn't imply metaphysical possibility; I think it does, but people like Kant don't, so ... anyway, even if it doesn't, one can almost as easily dispense with the conceptual coherence premise and boldly assert the metaphysical possibility of the being in question.
... but that isn't what I'm getting at with the above comment. I'm just trying to establish the general principle that if you accept a particular logic within a particular context, you're obligated to accept all of the purely logical theorems of that logic.
Also: A fucked up conclusion from seemingly sound premises does not indicate that the fucked up conclusion must be true. It can also indicate an error in the premises that you havne't detected, beyond that it led to the fucked up conclusion and therefore it's probable you've missed SOMETHING. And sometimes you hammer away and your fucked up conclusion becomes more and more solid, despite being fucked up (cf quantum mechanics)
I'm talking about PURELY LOGICAL theorems, not something that can be subject to merely seeming plausibility of premises, unless, of course, you consider the purely logical rules of inference to be subject to questioning. Luckily, I do; I think a logic is fitted to a particular context. There may be a fundamental sublogic, however. Interestingly, some people have suggested that the way to get around logical problems which exist between SR and QM is to change a rule of inference; they call the resulting logical quantum, the big change being that distribution isn't valid (that is, "(p & (q or r))" doesn't imply "((p or q) & (p or r))"). I haven't really studied quantum logic, unfortunately; I think I'll have to do some reading.
I came across a quote a loooong time ago whose import stuck with me, though alas the authour and exact phrasing did not. To paraphrase as best I can; journalism is separated from gossip not by the 5 Ws (who, what, when, where, why) but rather by two specific questions, "who says so?" and "how do they know?"
-- Steve thinks that, when asked properly, those two questions separate a lot of chaff from the wheat.
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(no subject)
Date: 2013-01-07 07:36 pm (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2013-01-08 12:00 am (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2013-01-08 04:38 pm (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2013-01-08 04:42 pm (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2013-01-08 04:52 pm (UTC)However, the ontological argument isn't based on purely logical principles. That something actual(izing) is greater (either in the metaphysical or epistemological senses) than something which is merely possible, while plausible, isn't a purely logical principle; Lewis argues that this premise isn't sound because the actual world isn't ontologically unique. That means that other possible worlds are spatiotemporal expanses of mass and energy, just like the actual world. Now, I disagree with Lewis here, because his "possible worlds" seem to me to be nothing more than a multiverse, all of which is contained within the actual world.
Establishing the premise that the omnipotent or omniscient is metaphysically possible is trickier, I admit. Maybe conceptual coherence doesn't imply metaphysical possibility; I think it does, but people like Kant don't, so ... anyway, even if it doesn't, one can almost as easily dispense with the conceptual coherence premise and boldly assert the metaphysical possibility of the being in question.
... but that isn't what I'm getting at with the above comment. I'm just trying to establish the general principle that if you accept a particular logic within a particular context, you're obligated to accept all of the purely logical theorems of that logic.
(no subject)
Date: 2013-01-08 04:44 pm (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2013-01-08 04:59 pm (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2013-01-07 08:10 pm (UTC)-- Steve thinks that, when asked properly, those two questions separate a lot of chaff from the wheat.